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Abstract 
The article provides an overview of the transformation of the planning function of the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) read against the study by Flyvbjerg 
( 1998) of the Aalborg Project. It focuses specifically on the human experience of the 
transformation process and the influence that power relations had on the outcome 
thereof. The study is historically situated within the broader context of the restructuring 
of local government in South Africa following the advent of a democratic dispensation 
in 1994. Theoretically it is dealt with both from the perspective of organisational theory 
and that of contemporary planning theory. The analysis shows that the CTMM is still a 
strongly managerialist environment where power is vested in the organisational 
hierarchy. It furthermore shows that democratic ideals are yet to precipitate in the day­
to-day operational activities of the municipality. The lack of regard for people is 
highlighted as a serious flaw in the transformation process. The role of communication 
as a powerful tool in exercising power is confirmed. More significantly, however, it is 
found that failure to communicate can be used effectively by those in power to silence 
the objections of the weaker party in an unequal power relationship. 
BEPLANNING IN DIE BLIK VAN STILTE: 'N FRONETIESE STUDIE VAN DIE 
HERSTRUKTURERING VAN DIE BEPLANNINGSFUNKSIE IN DIE TSHWANE 
METROPOLITIAANSE MUNISIPALITEIT 
Die artikel gee 'n oorsig van die transformasie van die beplanningsfunksie van die Staci 
Tshwane Metropolitaanse Munisipaliteit (STMM) gelees teen die agtergrond van 
Flyvbjerg (1998) se studie van die Aalborgprojek. Dit fokus spesifiek op die menslike 
ervaring van die transformasieproses en die invloed wat magsverhoudings op die 
u.itkoms daarvan gehad het. Die studie is histories binne die breer konteks van die
herstrukturering van plaaslike bestuur in Suid-Afrika no die aanbreek van 'n
demokratiese bestel in 1994 gelee. Teoreties word dit vanuit die perspektief van sowel
die organisasieteorie as kontemporere beplanningsteorie beskou. Die analise toon dot
die STMM steeds 'n sterk bestuursmatige omgewing is, waar mag in die hierargiese
struktuur van die organisasie gesetel is. Dit loon verder dot demokratiese ideale nog nie
in die daaglikse aktiwiteite van die munisipaliteit neerslag gevind het nie. Die gebrek
aan konsiderasie vir mense word as 'n ernstige tekortkoming in die transformasieproses
uitgewys. Die rol van kommunikasie as 'n kragtige instrument in die uitoefening van mag
word bevestig. Van meer belong, egter, word gevind dot die versuim om te
kommunikeer effektief deur diegene in 'n magsposisie gebruik kan word om die
besware van die swakker party in 'n oneweredige magsverhouding die swye op te le.
Practice-oriented social (case) study that does not aim at finding absolute empirical 
answers as is the case in the natural sciences. Flyvbjerg (2001) enriched the original concept 
of 'phronesis', as defined by Aristotle, by adding the dimension of power. The Tshwane study 
follows this school. 
1. INTRODUCTION
T
he establishment of a new unicity
municipality represented a
significant departure from the
previous dispensation for local 
government in the Tshwane area. The 
implementation of the new structure 
started with a round of municipal 
elections on 5 December 2000 and 
was preceded by the gargantuan 
task of compiling a comprehensive 
body of legislation that would set out 
the framework for and provide 
guidance with regard to the multiple 
processes involved. Most significant in 
this regard, is the Municipal Systems 
Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000), which 
regulates the relationship between 
the municipality and the community 
that it serves and forms part of. Yet, at 
the point when implementation 
actually started, it was, more than 
anything, a human drama that 
unfolded. It is this drama of people 
with widely divergent backgrounds, 
personalities and ambitions aspiring 
to, wielding and oppressed by power 
in a highly managerialist environment 
that forms the focus of this study. 
2. LENSES AND ANGLES
The theoretical framework within 
which the Tshwane story is read, 
illuminates the case from two angles, 
namely that of organisational theory 
on the one hand and a specific focus 
within contemporary planning theory 
on the other. 
2.1 Organisational theory 
Organisational theory particularly 
theories related to organisational 
change, provide useful perspectives 
to a study of planners working within 
a large organisational structure such 
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as that of the municipality. Authors 
such as Mir et al. (2002), Beech et al. 
(2002: online), Gellerman (1995), Puth 
(1994), Skopec (1990) and Myers, M.T. 
& Myers, G.E. ( 1982), among others, 
argue that communication is the 
primary tool for managing 
organisational change. In their case 
for communicating managers, these 
authors advocate a people-oriented 
approach to organisational 
management. 
The Tshwane municipality represents a 
distinct form of organisation, namely 
bureaucracy. Bennis ( 1993: 3) 
describes bureaucracy as "a social 
invention which relies exclusively on 
the power to influence through 
reason and law". The fact that, in a 
bureaucracy, rationality is expected 
to prevail over other forms of power, 
makes for an environment suited to 
studying the relationship and dynamic 
interaction between power and 
rationality. Bureaucracies have been 
widely criticised for enforcing 
conformity, stifling creativity and 
limiting access to power and 
information through their hierarchical 
structure (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Landry & 
Bianchini, 1995; Bennis, 1993; Merton 
(in Ott, 1989)). 
The Tshwane municipality is what Boje 
( 199 l) refers to as a managerialist 
organisation. In such an organisation, 
the underlying supposition is that 
better management is the solution to 
most economic and social problems. 
In managerialist organisations, stories 
are used to transfer knowledge, 
communicate vision and accomplish 
change. Boje (l 991) argues for an 
approach to storytelling organisations 
that is neither managerialist nor 
functionalist, but rather acknowledges 
a pluralism of plots and exposes the 
interplay between marginalised 
(silent) and dominant (hegemonic) 
stories in an organisation. 
2.2 Planning theory 
The central position accorded to 
people and the emphasis on 
communication that characterise 
contemporary theories of organisation 
and change also dominate 
contemporary debates on planning 
theory. In addressing this 
"communicative turn" in planning, 
Healey (1995: 218) describes this new 
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wave of planning theory as 
argumentative, communicative and 
interpretative. In recent years, a 
growing number of planning theorists, 
including Jean Hillier, Charles Hoch. 
Judith Innes, Helen Liggett, Tom Stein, 
Tom Harper, Seymour Mandelbaum, 
Tore Sager and Jeff Throgmorton 
(Yiftachel & Huxley, 2001) have 
contributed to this focus, inspired 
mainly, as is Healey, by the work of 
Habermas. 
The communicative turn in planning 
opened poststructuralist and 
multicultural debates on the nature of 
knowledge, ethics and justice. This led 
a number of planning theorists to 
focus on communicative-pragmatic 
logic, accumulating evidence about 
speech, narratives, professional 
profiles, consensus building and 
negotiation (Hoch, 1996; Yiftachel & 
Huxley, 2001 ). 
The process of communicative action 
as defined by Habermas and applied 
by planning theorists provided a new 
perspective on the complex web of 
social and power relations within 
which planning practice takes place. 
Communicative planning theory 
therefore places much emphasis on 
practice and the analysis of practice 
examples - a trend described in the 
literature as "the practice 
movement". 
Authors such as Hillier (2002), Flyvbjerg 
(2001, 1998), Watson (2001), 
Mandelbaum et al. ( 1996) and 
Forester ( 1982) argue for the use of 
practice stories to strengthen theory, 
which in turn has as its aim the 
improvement of practice. Most often, 
the study of practice is done by way 
of richly detailed case studies 
rendered in the narrative form. 
Mandelbaum et al. ( 1996) recognises 
a strong interest in the actions and 
experience of the professional 
planner in practice. Theorists 
increasingly acknowledge the need 
to listen to and register the daily 
interactive work of planning 
professionals (see also Hillier (2002), 
Watson (2001) and Flyvbjerg (1998)). 
Hillier (2002) calls the practical 
wisdom that emerges from this kind of 
practice-centered theorising 
'prudence'. Flyvbjerg (2001: 56) gives 
much the same definition to 
'phronesis', which he describes as 
"practical knowledge and practical 
ethics". Flyvbjerg adds the dimension 
of power to the classical concept of 
'phronesis', specifically the 
Foucauldian concept of power 
relations. 
The viewpoints on power developed 
by Foucault in the 1990s were used by 
a number of planners to gain a better 
understanding of the forces at work in 
the relational/social web within which 
planning is practiced. These include 
Hillier (2002), Lapintie (2001 ), 
Allmendinger (2001 ), Watson (2001) 
and Kogler ( 1999). Hillier (2002) argues 
that Foucault's work aids 
understanding of power in the 
multiplicity of micropractices that 
comprise everyday life as well as 
understanding power as a relational 
process rather than as a commodity 
operating from the top down. Hoch 
( 1996) argues that Foucault's concept 
of power relations provides an 
important critique on the professions 
(such as the planning profession) that 
claim to serve the communal good. 
The work of Bent Flyvbjerg (2001, 
1998), which draws heavily on the 
Foucauldian theory of power and 
rationality, as well as the work of 
philosophers Kant, Nietzsche and 
Machiavelli, has contributed greatly 
to the new focus on power relations in 
planning theory. In his seminal work, 
Planning in the Face of Power ( 1982), 
Forester explores the control of 
information as a key source of 
planners' power. 
The question of the relationship of 
planning and politics is densely 
interwoven with the question of 
planning, planners and power. In his 
classical text on planners and politics, 
Catanese ( 197 4)2 sees the fact that
the planner is never in a role to 
implement his/her own plans as a 
fundamental difficulty of the 
municipal planning profession. He 
discredits the concept that the 
wisdom of a planner can prevail in 
the face of politics. 
It is clear that the relationship 
between planning and politics is a 
complex one. Planners are always at 
risk of being exploited by those in 
power to secure their position and 
they are often not equipped to play 
Although this is indeed a very old source and the relevance thereof for this study might be questioned on those grounds, we view it as a seminal 
text that influences the discourse on planning and politics even today. 
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the political game of influence and 
manipulation. Very often, the only 
tool available to planners to leverage 
power is what Habermas (in Flyvbjerg, 
1998: 30, 86) refers to as "the better 
argument". Habermas believed "the 
better argument" to be a rational 
argument arrived at through open 
discussion. The catch, of course, is 
that in reality "the better argument" is 
not necessarily the rational argument, 
but merely the argument preferred by 
the party that holds the most power ... 
3. HOW NOTHING MUCH
CHANGED IN TSHWANE
3.1 A new era dawns 
With the establishment of the new 
municipality for the area now known 
as Tshwane3, the four former 
municipal structures that it replaced 
were given the status of 
Administrative Units, each with an 
Administrative Unit Manager (CTMM, 
2000). In addition, eleven Divisions 
were established, each headed by a 
Divisional Manager. The Divisional 
Managers were responsible for 
managing specific functions, or 
'Divisions', on a matrix basis across all 
the Administrative Units. 'City 
Planning' did not feature on the list of 
the new Divisions. Rather, it resorted 
under the Economic Development 
Division alongside Transport Planning 
and Management, Fresh Produce 
Market, and Local Economic 
Development.4
While the Divisional Manager 
responsible for planning was finding 
her feet, the Chief Planner at the 
former Metropolitan Council initiated 
o process to restructure the planning
function (CTMM, 2001 b). The working
group driving the process consisted
almost exclusively of existing
managers. This process was, however,
terminated by the Divisional Manager
after conflict developed between her
and the former Chief Planner. At the
same time, a strong bond of 
friendship had formed between the
Divisional Manager and a Senior Town
Planner in the Chief Planner in
question's team.
The Divisional Manager instituted a 
new restructuring process for the 
planning function and named her 
friend, the Senior Town Planner, as 
convener of the process (CTMM, 
2001c). The new process was 
rationalised on the basis of criticism 
against the process managed by the 
former Chief Planner, namely: 
inadequate participation; 
inadequate communication; 
lack of sufficient coordination 
with other functions and 
disciplines; and 
a lack of a clearly defined 
mandate and terms of reference 
to guide the restructuring 
initiatives (CTMM, 20010). 
The convener for the new 
restructuring process completed a 
Work plan for the Restructuring of the 
City Planning Component (Van der 
Merwe, 2001 ), which set out the terms 
of reference, purpose and objectives, 
process and approach, risk 
management and time frames for the 
restructuring of the planning function. 
The convener's effort in compiling the 
plan, which was nothing other than a 
change strategy, was particularly 
laudable in the light of the fact that, 
on a corporate level, no such strategy 
existed to guide the transformation of 
the municipality as a whole. 
3.2 A core team and task teams 
In terms of the work plan, a core 
team and task teams had to be 
established to manage the 
restructuring process. Just as the 
convenor was appointed on the basis 
of her friendship with the Divisional 
Manager, the other core team 
members and task team leaders were 
also selected on the basis of a 
network of friendships and past 
acquaintances with the convenor 
and other members of her team. It 
almost became a mantra in the core 
team discussions that theirs was a 
'transparent and participative' 
process.5 Yet, in spite of this, the 
additional core team members and 
the task team leaders were chosen 
by the core team in an autocratic 
fashion that reeked of cronyism. 
As part of the core team's 
commitment to communication (the 
lack of which was one of the criticisms 
against the Chief Planner's process), 
newsletters and memoranda were 
frequently compiled and distributed 
to staff members (CTMM, 2001 d; 
CTMM, 20011; CTMM, 2001g; CTMM, 
2001h; CTMM, 2001k). This was 
supplemented with small group 
meetings and workshops involving all 
the planning staff. While serving as a 
valuable source of information for the 
planning officials, who had until that 
point largely been kept in the dark 
regarding the restructuring process, it 
also served as a mechanism to 
entrench the core team's relative 
position of power. Although the core 
team members stated amongst each 
other that they aspired to managerial 
positions in the municipality and 
hoped that their positions in the core 
team would promote their chances in 
this regard, the communication issued 
by the team always emphasised that 
they had not been 'promoted' in any 
way. All communication with the 
Divisional Manager was routed 
through the core team, thus also 
strengthening their position within the 
organisational hierarchy. 
The time of the establishment of the 
core team was turbulent in many 
respects. There was no relationship 
between the new top management 
and the officials, mostly because of 
the complete lack of communication 
from the side of the Top 
Management. Furthermore, there was 
no guidance with regard to so-called 
Management Regions within the 
larger Tshwane area (CTMM, 2001e), 
which would particularly affect land 
use management. 
To meet the political demand for 
racial equity in their structure, the 
core team nominated three black 
staff members as additional members 
of the core team and introduced so­
called 'co-task team leaders' who 
would work with the task team 
leaders and 'be empowered' in the 
process. In effect, every single black 
official in the planning function was 
made part of the wider core team 
structure. While this certainly looked 
very impressive and seemingly 
achieved the core team's stated 
objective of racial equity, there was 
little authenticity to it. Most of the 
core team discussions took place 
without the black members. They 
An area including, but not limited to. what was formerly known as the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area. 
The Wonderboom Airport was later added to the list. 
Just as often, this was placed in juxtaposition to the Chief Planner's process, which was said to have been 'exclusive and top-down'. 
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were isolated due to the fact that 
they did not share the core team's 
offices and were often 'forgotten' 
when informal or impromptu meetings 
were called. It would seem that the 
initial members of the Core Team had 
an alliance that was not shared by 
the extended group and that the 
efforts to promote racial equity did 
not amount to much more than 
window-dressing. 
Nonetheless, the co-task team 
leaders responded with amazing 
alacrity to the challenge put to them 
by the core team and by the end of 
June 2001 most of them had 
progressed to the point where a work 
plan and proposed organogram for 
each of the component functions of 
the planning function were available. 
3.3 The core team gets a curve ball 
An unexpected development came 
towards the end of June 2001, when a 
new organisational structure for the 
municipality that had been approved 
by the Mayoral Committee was 
distributed to the Administrative Unit 
Managers, from whence the core 
team obtained it. The new structure 
was compiled by an external 
consultant and no consultation on it 
whatsoever had taken place with the 
municipality's internal stakeholders. It 
consisted of 8 Strategic Units (later 
called Divisions and finally Depart­
ments), headed by Strategic 
Executives (later called Strategic 
Executive Officers or SEO's). With this 
arrangement, the Administrative Units 
ceased to exist and the structure of the 
new unified City of Tshwane Metro­
politan Municipality came into being. 
The new Economic Development 
Department consisted of two 
components, namely Public Transport 
and Local Economic Development. It 
was clear that planning was no longer 
part of this function. On the face of it, 
it was also not part of any other 
function. The core team was no 
longer certain whether their 
champion, the Divisional Manager, 
would be permanently appointed. 
The new structure perpetuated the 
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disregard for the planning function. In 
fact, where City Planning was at least 
mentioned as one of the components 
of former Economic Development 
Division, there was now no mention 
whatsoever of it in the new structure. 
Any hopes the core team cherished 
that their former Divisional Manager 
would remain their manager were 
dashed by a letter, Circular 1 of 2001, 
distributed by the Municipal Manager 
on 2 July 2001 (CTMM, 200lj). The 
letter ordered all acting Divisional 
Managers to return to their previous 
posts immediately without thanks for 
their contribution. Apart from this 
general circular, no personal 
communication had taken place to 
inform the Divisional Managers of the 
new developments. The Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) later referred 
to Circular 1 of 2001 as "the most 
inhumane document I had ever seen" 
because of the unfeeling manner in 
which it dismissed the acting Divisional 
Managers and the lack of 
acknowledgement for their 
contribution it displayed. 
The only indication of where the 
planning function lay on the new 
structure was the recruitment 
advertisements for the Strategic 
Executive Officers and the General 
Managers. It was clear from the 
advertisement for the Strategic 
Executive Officer (SEO) for Housing 
(CTMM, 2001 i) that the planning 
function was seen as part of the 
Housing Directorate.6 It was, however,
not clear whether it would resort 
under the General Manager: Housing 
or the General Manager: Land and 
Environmental Planning, which were 
the two legs of the new Directorate. 
3.4 Finding a foothold in the new 
structure 
In the light of this uncertainty, the 
acting General Manager for Land and 
Environmental planning, who was also 
the Executive Director of City Planning 
and Development in the former City 
Council of Pretoria, offered to manage 
the planning function for the interim in 
the light of his long standing 
relationship with the function. To the 
core team's surprise he indicated that 
he was satisfied with the work they had 
done to date and that he intended to 
retain the team. The core team had 
expected that he would disband the 
core team and revert back to the 
existing managers. 
Yet, the core team's relief would prove 
to be short lived. The acting general 
manager to whom they reported 
received a faxed organogram of the 
planning function from the acting 
Strategic Executive officer indicating 
that another person, a long-time 
colleague of the acting Strategic 
Executive Officer, would act as the 
coordinator of the planning function, 
leaving the core team convener out in 
the cold. Once again an official who 
had worked in an acting capacity was 
dismissed in a mechanistic and 
unfeeling manner. However, the acting 
General Manager placed two former 
core team members in the co­
ordinators' positions for the land use 
planning and strategic spatial planning 
functions. In a letter to all staff in the 
planning function, (CTMM, 2001 m), the 
new coordinator for planning brought 
the coordinators into the mainstream 
of management of the function, albeit 
merely in an acting capacity. The letter 
stated that "the Coordinators will have 
the full operational responsibility of the 
functions Tshwane-wide". The existing 
line managers were to act as 'Regional 
Coordinators' who would report to the 
functional coordinators. This meant that 
the coordinators were no longer 
merely responsible for restructuring as 
was the case in the core team 
(although that responsibility remained), 
but that they now also had to manage 
the day-to-day operations of their 
functions. 
The operational environment was in a 
state of disarray when the new 
coordinator appeared on the scene. 
Aspects such as the availability of 
leave forms bearing the name of the 
new municipality, signing powers, 
letterheads, a filing system and the 
budget had to be attended to (CTMM, 
2002d).7 At that stage the City Planning
It furthermore caused confusion that the Division: Housing, had the same name as that of the Strategic Unit/Deportment: Housing, of which it 
was a part. The confusion that emerged regarding names of functions and structures (e.g. Directorate, Deportment, Division, Strategic Unit 
were all at some stage used to refer to the larger 'Housing' structure, became a comedy of errors in itself that spoke volumes about the lack 
of stability that characterised the restructuring process. As far as the names were concerned, at least, such stability could have been 
established with ease through proper communication by the top management. 
Week after week, these issues remained on the agenda of the Coordinators' meeting. By October 2001, there was still uncertainty regarding 
support services for the function (CTMM, 200lr). Most of the co-ordinators did not have secretaries and none of the officials were sure where 
to apply for stationery to be ordered. or how the filing system had operated since December 2000. 
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Division functioned 'unofficially' under 
the Housing Department (CTMM, 
20011). It was a thorn in the side of the 
planning Co-ordinators that there was 
no reference to 'Planning' in the name 
of the Department. 
3.5 Something old, something 
new 
While the Regional Spatial Planning 
(land use planning) function had a 
strong operational focus, the Strategic 
Metropolitan Spatial Planning (SMSP) 
function had to be established de 
nova. The relevant coordinator invited 
planners to form part of the new 
function. Those who responded were 
all former colleagues and friends of 
the coordinator. 
During the second half of 2001, the 
initiating members of the SMSP 
function spent many hours in lengthy 
and intense discussions on the shape 
and content of the future function. 
Once again, as was the case with the 
core team more than a year earlier, a 
stimulating synergy developed in the 
small group that initiated the SMSP 
function. 
The team used a generic strategic 
planning process as the point of 
departure for the structure of the 
function. Careful consideration was 
given to the characteristics that 
would be required of the people who 
would work in each component of 
the function. Sadly, it was not possible 
to create new posts or fill existing 
vacancies with external candidates 
who met the SMSP initiators' ambitious 
requirements. Ultimately, planners 
who were working in related functions 
(e.g. the research function) slotted in 
under the SMSP function 'by default'. 
Despite efforts to establish a 
completely new function, much of 
the existing structure had to be 
retained. The persistence of the 'old' 
structure was emerging as one of 
many themes that seemed to run like 
a golden thread through the story of 
Tshwane's restructuring process. 
In an attempt to convey the 
importance of the planning function 
to Councilors, the SMSP team 
compiled a document under the title 
of "City Planning - a rough guide" 
setting out in very basic terms what 
the function was all about (CTMM, 
200 lo). The guide consisted of l O 
pages with ample illustration and text 
in a large font size with headings such 
as "What is a city?", "Why do cities 
have to be planned?", "What is the 
city planning function?" etc. It was 
hoped that the document would 
effectively convey the importance of 
planning to the Councillors, who had 
no background in town and regional 
planning. What was not articulated, 
though, was the condescension that 
could be inferred from the manner in 
which the document was presented. 
The tone and format was that which 
one would have employed to convey 
a message to children. It bespoke the 
officials' deep-seated distrust of the 
competence of the new leadership. 
Nonetheless, the document was 
copied and distributed at the next 
meeting of the Mayoral Committee 
and was apparently well received. 
Unfortunately, it did not result in any 
change with regard to the status of 
the planning function. 
The SMSP management team 
members were exasperated when 
they heard of a symposium on The 
Restructuring and Rebirth of the City 
ofTshwone (CTMM, 200ls; CTMM, 
200lt), which was a joint effort 
between the CTMM, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and the University of Pretoria. The 
symposium hod as its purpose to 
"discuss issues of urban restructuring, 
urban growth and the apartheid 
City's impact on human 
development", which clearly 
indicated a focus on 'spatial' 
restructuring. Some enquiries followed, 
and eventually the SMSP 
management team was invited to 
attend the first day of the workshop. 
Only one of the team members was 
invited to the second day, which 
would focus on a more exclusive 
programme. This increased the 
uncertainty the SMSP team felt 
regarding their place in the bigger 
picture of the municipality. They hod 
been ignored and their expertise 
disregarded. This was one of many 
indications of the fragmentation of 
the new structure and the lack of 
communication and co-ordination 
that prevailed. 
In the light of the lack of guidance 
regarding possible management 
regions for the Tshwane area, the 
Regional Spatial Planning team 
decided to take matters into their 
own hands and proposed a model of 
eight management regions. The 
proposal was accepted, not only by 
the planners, but also, to the surprise 
of the planners, by the transportation 
engineers. This was another example 
of planning officials taking the 
initiative on important issues in the 
absence of leadership from the new 
top management.8 A team of
planners was put in place for each 
region and each planning team was 
headed by an acting Deputy 
Manager. The new teams set to work 
immediately to deal with the backlog 
that had built up as a result of the 
delay in restoring the delegated 
authority of the town planners, which 
had initially been revoked with the 
establishment of the new municipal 
structure and was again in question 
after the introduction of the new 
organisational structure 
(Bezuidenhout, 2002: interview). 
3.6 The battle for recognition 
continues 
The planning coordinator and her 
team used every available 
opportunity to try to obtain 
recognition for the planning function 
on the level of General Manager. In 
the draft consolidated organisational 
strategy of the Housing Directorate 
(CTMM, 2001 n), it was stated, for 
example, that City Planning was one 
of the key responsibilities of the 
Directorate, which "implies that there 
should be a separate division within 
the Department Housing Services, to 
execute the city planning and zoning 
function". Yet despite these rational 
arguments, there was no response 
from the top management. It would 
be almost two years before the 
planning function was recognized as 
a function on the level of General 
Manager in the organisational 
structure. 
The situation had not improved by 
September of 2001 when the official 
who up to that stage was the 
Divisional Manager: Operations in the 
office of the Municipal Manager was 
appointed as the Strategic Executive 
Officer: Housing, without the post 
having been advertised. At the first 
meeting of the Management 
Structure of the Department of 
Housing, Land Use and Environmental 
Another example of this was the initiative taken by the Core Team to "get the ball rolling" with regard to the process for the compilation of an 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. 
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Planning (HOLEP), which was the new 
name given to the Housing 
Directorate, the position of the 
planning coordinator as acting 
General Manager for the planning 
function "while the status of the 
function was being formalised" was 
confirmed (CTMM, 2001p). At the 
meeting, the Strategic Executive 
Officer made it clear that the focus of 
the Department would be "housing 
provision", as this would be what the 
success of the municipality would be 
judged on at the end of its five-year 
term. 
On 10 and 11 April 2002 a workshop 
called "disastrous" (CTMM, 2002b) by 
the Strategic Executive Officer was 
held to discuss the organisational 
structure. The Councillors who 
attended the workshop were not 
satisfied with the format in which 
information on the proposed 
organisational structure was 
presented and refused to participate. 
The Councillors furthermore wanted to 
know what informed the proposed 
organisational structure, what the 
core business of the Council was, and 
whether a strategy existed for 
Tshwane. This incident clearly 
indicated a muddling of roles and a 
lack of political leadership. The 
Councilors, who could reasonably be 
expected to provide leadership and 
strategic guidance, were, almost a 
year and a half after the new local 
government came into being, asking 
of the officials what the core business 
and strategy of the municipality was. 
3.7 Frustration and suspicion 
In the midst of the confusion about 
the corporate structure and the 
uncertainty experienced by officials 
regarding their future at the 
municipality, widespread negativity 
and absenteeism was the order of the 
day. In a memorandum addressed to 
all staff members on 28 November 
2001 (CTMM, 2001r), the Strategic 
Executive: Corporate Services wrote 
the following: "It has been brought to 
our attention that since the 
disestablishment of the various 
Municipalities within the City of 
Tshwane, office hours are being 
totally disregarded by most 
officials ... " (our emphasis). In order to 
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encourage adherence to the official 
working hours, the acting General 
Manager requested all coordinators 
in the planning function to keep an 
attendance register, as well as a 
register for signing in and out when 
attending meetings out of the office. 
The delay in finalising the new 
structure and the staffing thereof was 
cited by most of the interviewees as 
the single largest frustration of the 
restructuring process. (Coetzee, 2004: 
interview). The Acting Managers 
found it difficult to perform optimally 
or initiate new projects while they 
were only gate-keeping. A quote 
from the draft minutes of the planning 
coordinators/managers meeting of 16 
November 2001 (CTMM, 2001q) 
captures the mood of the planners 
and their suspicions towards the top 
management (unedited): "Problems 
regarding the unhappiness of people 
citywide as a result of uncertainty ... 
Frustrating strategy by the top brass to 
let you pack up and leave the 
workforce ... ". In the same document, 
the following is also noted from the 
discussion (unedited): 
"Communication internally is very 
important. Corporate decisions should 
be communicated to the staff via the 
managers. Communication from 
corporate level is very bad, virtually 
non-existent. We are fortunate that 
we have [X] as SEO [(Strategic 
Executive Officer)] who at least 
communicates information to his 
managerial staff" (my parenthesis 
added). 
Most of the planners interviewed 
expressed a lack of confidence in the 
top management as well as the 
political leadership. They complained 
that the Municipal Manager as well 
as the Mayor and Councillors were 
inaccessible and that they had had 
very limited contact with them. There 
were also complaints that the top 
management did not function as a 
team. Although it was more than a 
year after the new structure officially 
came into existence, operational 
problems such as lack of available 
office space, concerns regarding 
asset control and staff shortages9 
(CTMM, 2002b) persisted. 
The long battle for recognition of the 
City Planning function continued 
unabated. A rumour was doing the 
rounds that the disregard for planning 
from the top management was part 
of a political strategy to undermine 
the position of power held by the 
planners in the previous dispensation. 
However, when put to the Strategic 
Executive Officer, he strongly denied 
this. 
3.8 The more things change ... 
It would be June 2003 before the issue 
of the status of the planning function 
was finalised. This followed months of 
enquiries, both written and verbal, to 
the SEO, who continued to indicate 
that he was attending to the matter 
and gave assurances on more than 
one occasion that he would take the 
matter up with the Municipal 
Manager. 
The Strategic Executive Officer (SEO) 
initially made some effort towards 
establishing a communication forum 
within the Department when he 
instituted the monthly HOLEP (Housing, 
Land and Environmental Planning) 
meeting with all the General 
Managers and Managers in the 
Department. At these meetings issues 
such as the budget, staff placement 
and shortages, the process for 
submitting reports to the Mayoral 
Committee, as well as the name of 
the Department, were discussed. The 
HOLEP meetings were the only 
chance for many of the managers to 
see the SEO in person and to feel 
some sense of belonging to the larger 
Department, which was scattered 
over a number of different buildings. 
Sadly, however, since the beginning 
of 2002, the HOLEP meetings were 
frequently postponed or cancelled 
and eventually stopped taking place 
altogether. 
In the absence of other forums on 
which to voice their frustrations to the 
SEO, the planning coordinators invited 
him to their meeting held on 2 May 
2002, "so that he can get an idea of 
the frustrations experienced" (CTMM, 
2002c). The Co-ordinators made full 
use of the opportunity and 
bombarded the SEO with a number 
of issues. This included the top-down 
management style employed by the 
top management. It was said that 
decisions were "forced on 
During a meeting of the Strategic Unit of the Department of Housing. Land and Environmental Planning (HOLEP) held on 23 April 2002 (CTMM 
2002b), it was reported that the Mayoral Committee had confirmed that only 40% of 'critical' vacancies throughout the municipality would be 
filled in the 2002/2003 financial year and that the rest would be frozen until further notice. 
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municipality should be part of its 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP), 
should have played an enabling role 
in this regard. Yet the Act does not 
provide much guidance with regard 
to 'the manner in which' the 
municipality should be restructured. 
Although resistance to change, 
culture clashes, maintaining staff 
morale, power play and manipulation 
are risks inherent to a process where 
different structures (Transitional Local 
Councils) are forced, by law, to 
amalgamate, no process is proposed 
in the relevant legislation to ensure 
that the internal transformation 
process takes place in a regulated 
manner. 
One could argue that it would have 
been helpful if broad guidelines for 
the transformation processes had 
been made available by 
Government. Such guidelines could 
have provided mechanisms to ensure 
transparency and consultation with or 
participation of all internal 
stakeholder groups in the 
transformation process, and could 
furthermore have provided a 
timeframe that would have 
prevented a situation such as that 
which developed at the CTMM, 
where officials worked in an acting 
capacity for almost two years 
(without additional remuneration). On 
the other hand, however, one could 
argue, as do Oranje and Harrison 
(2001) regarding the IDP, that the 
absence of specific practical 
guidelines or prescriptions leaves 
welcome room for flexibility and local 
innovation. In the Tshwane case, 
however, such innovation is sadly 
lacking. 
4.3 Batho Pele? We think not 
The restructuring of the Tshwane 
planning function was not about 
plans at all - it was about people. 
The failure of the new Tshwane top 
management to communicate 
should not merely be viewed in terms 
of a failure to communicate 
operational communication, which 
had an impact on the productivity 
and efficiency of the administrative 
processes necessary for effective 
service delivery. Rather, it was a 
failure to establish a relationship 
between the officials and their new 
leadership and in particular, a failure 
to create a caring environment within 
which the psychological contract 
between employee and employer, 
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which Mir et al. (2002) refers to, could 
be established. 
Rather than putting people first, as 
dictated by Government's Botha 
Phele (people first) principle, it would 
seem that in the Tshwane story, the 
majority of people, namely the 
officials transferred to the new 
municipality from the former 
structures, were often the very last 
consideration. In the story, these 
people were very often ignored, 
sidelined, disregarded and 
threatened - and thereby made to 
feel worthless. There is very little 
evidence in the study of the ubuntu, 
or humaneness that is a characteristic 
trait of African culture. Although there 
seemed to have been pockets of 
staff within which a sense of cohesion 
and caring existed, on the whole the 
municipality lacked a sense of 
"community" as described by Peck 
( 1994). At the same time, as far as the 
new top management was 
concerned, people were indeed put 
first. For these people speedy 
confirmation of their new posts and 
exorbitant salaries, select parking 
spaces and luxury offices, among 
other things, denoted their status as 
'first officials' of the CTMM. 
As the balance of power rested in the 
hands of the new Tshwane top 
management, it could furthermore be 
argued that it was their responsibility 
and, in terms of the role of the 
Municipal Manager as the head of 
the municipality's administration, his, 
to have ensured that the Tshwane 
officials were made to feel part of the 
new municipality. 
The manifestation of the change 
within the micro-environment of the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality can, however, be 
viewed as an example of unplanned 
change. Not only was it unplanned, it 
could furthermore be described in 
terms of Bennis's ( 1993: 97) category 
of 'coercive change', which is 
characterised by "non-mutual goal 
setting, an imbalanced power ratio 
and only one-sided deliberateness". 
Despite the prescriptions of the 
Municipal Systems Act regarding 
participation, the Tshwane planning 
officials were neither given the 
opportunity to fully and meaningfully 
participate in the transformation of 
the municipality in general or of their 
function in particular, nor where they 
communicated with or consulted on 
it. Rather than partners in the process 
of transformation, the new political 
and administrative management and 
the officials seemed to be opposing 
forces. 
4.4 The importance of 
communication confirmed 
The importance placed on 
communication both in the 
organisational theory studied and in 
the survey of recent planning theory is 
strongly supported by the story of 
Tshwane's planning function. Both in 
terms of the absence thereof in some 
instances and the use thereof in 
others, communication played a 
central role in shaping the experience 
of the restructuring process. 
The consistent absence of clear and 
frequent communication by the new 
top management, particularly the 
Mayor and the Municipal Manager 
(later referred to as the Chief 
Executive Officer) had a significant 
impact on the restructuring process. 
Rather than encouraging the officials 
to become part of the new structure 
and winning their loyalty, the silence 
experienced from the top resulted in 
the officials experiencing the change 
of management as a hostile 
takeover, which caused emotions of 
fear, distrust and resentment. The 
reality that the new top management 
was almost in its entirety constituted 
of black individuals and the vast 
majority of the officials were white, 
necessarily imbued the situation with 
racial overtones - a circumstance 
that made the possibility of achieving 
a new, unified structure even less 
likely. 
The significant uncertainty as to the 
location and status of City Planning 
within the new organisational 
structure could certainly have been 
addressed through timeous and open 
communication. Yet despite 
numerous enquiries from the officials, 
there was no attempt by top 
management to engage the officials 
to address this burning issue. 
The open confrontation that develops 
between the Technical Department 
and the Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce in the Aalborg case study, 
is possible only because of the friction 
between two parties with equal, or 
comparable, power. Because of the 
unequal distribution of power 
between the officials and the top 
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management in the Tshwane 
structure open confrontation does not 
take place. The situation therefore 
never evolves to one where 
metaphors of war are appropriate as 
is the case in Flyvbjerg's (1998) 
Aalborg study. The Tshwane situation 
simply progresses from an uneasy, 
unarticulated animosity to a sense of 
resignation on the side of the 
planners. In the face of the silence 
from the top management, and 
given their position of relative 
powerlessness in the organisational 
hierarchy, the planners have no 
means to resist decisions that affect 
them. In Tshwane, it is perhaps not 
communication that turns out to be 
the most powerful tool of those in 
power after all, but rather the 
decision 'not' to communicate. "Non­
activity" it seems, can sometimes also 
be indicative of a party's relative 
power (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 67). It would 
furthermore seem, both from the 
Aalborg case and from the Tshwane 
study, that rationality as power is only 
effective when the two parties 
involved have relatively equal 
powers. In Aalborg, the Technical 
Department succeeds in their rational 
response to the Social Democrats' 
"Dream Plan" (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 165) 
because of the comparable power of 
the two parties. In the Tshwane case, 
however, the rationality presented by 
the planners failed because of their 
position of relative powerlessness 
within the municipal hierarchy. 
At the level of the planning function, 
communication was exploited as a 
tool to the maximum effect. The core 
team used communication both as a 
mechanism to entrench their position 
of power and as a "stroking device" 
to avoid confrontation and to win the 
support of the planning officials. The 
support that was garnered for the 
Divisional Manager and the 
restructuring process can to a large 
extent be ascribed to the frequent 
communication she had with the 
officials. The response from the 
officials indicated that it was not so 
much the written communication in 
the form of newsletters and circulars 
that was appreciated, but especially 
the face-to-face communication in 
the form of road shows, information 
sessions, workshops and small group 
meetings. 
It could be argued that, had such 
direct communication been 
sustained, and had it been extended 
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to include the Strategic Executive 
Officer, and even the Mayor or CEO, 
the team spirit and motivation levels 
of the planners would have been 
greatly improved. It would also have 
contributed to the establishment of a 
strong "psychological contract" (see 
Mir et al., 2002: 187) with the 
municipality, which would in turn 
have led to increased productivity 
and loyalty. 
5. CONCLUSION
Yiftachel & Huxley (2001: 97) define 
planning after Lefebvre as "the public 
production of space; that is, all 
policies and practices which shape 
the urban and regional environment 
under the auspices of the modern 
state". We would argue, however, 
that planning is more than this, that it 
is not only all the dimensions of a 
profession producing, acting on or 
engaging with space, but that it is 
also the internal organisation, 
positioning and functioning of the 
planning team. Although the latter 
issues relate to procedural rather than 
substantive matters, to use the 
distinction drawn by Forester ( 1982), 
they can play a pivotal role in 
determining how effective an agent 
of 'space-making' such a team can 
be. In the South African context, 
where the need for spatial 
development and integration is so 
great, these aspects are all the more 
important. 
The conditions within the CTMM 
during the study period were far from 
ideal. Yet one could hardly have 
asked for a better environment in 
which to gain experience on working 
within dynamic and complex power 
relations - power relations that 
always, however subtly, carried the 
added dimension of race in a city 
and country still struggling to redress 
the aftermath of its apartheid past. In 
that sense, the CTMM was indeed the 
ideal environment for planners, "to 
learn how to make their arguments 
under systematically skewed 
conditions of access, voice, power 
and authority" (Forester, 1982: 80). As 
such the municipality was merely a 
microcosm of the society it served 
and of which it was also an 
institutional member. We believe this 
to be true of any public institution in 
which planning teams/departments 
are constituted, which builds our 
argument for considering the internal 
organisation of planning teams as an 
important focus for studies of planning 
practice. 
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